The accident

86 squadron was due to re-equip with Consolidated Liberators for maritime patrol duties in the autumn of 1942. In preparation for this they were flying their Bristol Beauforts out to Malta (via Gibraltar) where they were to be used to attack the convoys carrying supplies to Rommel's Afrika Korps. The aircraft were flown to No. 1 Overseas Aircraft Despatch Unit at RAF Portreath where the crew rested for a week before taking off for Gibraltar five minutes prior to the crash. The Bristol Beaufort was one of a series of aircraft developed by Bristol from the earlier Blenheim bomber. The type did not actually start torpedo bombing operations until 1941, by summer 1942 it was considered obsolete and was being replaced in that role by the later Beaufighter. The Beaufort was a difficult plane to fly and was prone to accidents, although some pilots did grow to like it. Although it was a twin-engine aircraft it lacked the power to fly in a completely controlled manner if one engine failed.

According to a letter received by us from the Air Historical Branch of the RAF;

"Our records about this accident say that the aircraft was on the strength of 86 but was being handled by No I Overseas Aircraft Delivery Unit for despatch overseas and was being ferried by a crew of 4 from Portreath to Gibraltar. The weather on the morning of 24 July 1942 was variable with a cloud base varying between 200 and 800 feet above airfield level. At the time of take-off the cloud was 9/10 at 800 feet with visibility of 3 miles, surface wind west south west 10 mph. The cloud was 2000-3000 feet thick. The pilot was instructed to take-off on a runway bearing 230T and to climb up on his first track of 240T through the cloud. The position of the crash and subsequent reports indicated that the aircraft was attempting to return to the airfield; this was presumed to be because of some defect. The aircraft took off at 0850 hours from Portreath in a south westerly direction. The cloud base was low. At 0855 hours the aircraft crashed into a chapel at Roscroggan from a direction which indicated that the aircraft was circling or returning to Portreath. Various eyewitnesses gave statements but these were not consistent; some said they saw smoke coming from the aircraft engines but others denied this. The accounts mostly agreed that the aircraft circled and that the engine note increased immediately before the crash. There is no mention of another aircraft in the vicinity."

The RAF's accident report card is inconclusive; the aircraft was burned out and there was no physical evidence left of any fault that had developed prior to impact. We know from the RAF Pilot's Notes manual for the Beaufort that it was very difficult to fly if one of its two engines had failed and we have reason to believe that the aircraft was laden beyond even its wartime maximum takeoff weight. We reason that most defects other than engine failure would have allowed the machine to retain its power and return to base so we believe that one engine had failed or was failing. At least one eyewitness (not interviewed by the RAF's accident investigators) mentions that the engine could be heard misfiring as the plane passed over Camborne. With a crew of four and a full load of fuel and ammunition the plane was far too heavy to maintain its altitude if an engine failed. The auxiliary fuel tank carried in the bomb bay could not be jettisoned nor could much of the fuel in the regular tanks. Very little could be jettisoned and no eyewitness reports suggest that anything was. The pilot had no choice but to descend below the cloud base and look for somewhere to bring the plane down. Unfortunately the cloud base was low that day giving him insufficient height to return to RAF Portreath.

Eyewitness Ella Whear wrote a very moving letter to Camborne Council in 2004 when she heard that the airmen were to be commemorated with a plaque at the site of the crash. We found it absolutely inspirational and are very thankful that we have been allowed to reproduce it here.

The transcript of our interview with Ella and Noel Whear can be found here.

The RAF's Crash Report Card.

The following explanation for the reasoning behind these cards has kindly been offered be Mr Andrew Dennis of the RAFM Hendon.

"Aircraft accidents would be reported in the majority of cases by the unit (different rules were in place for aircraft in transit or on detached duty) on a Form 765(C). Responsibility lay with the Squadron Commander (or whomever he chose to delegate to) to submit these Forms within four days of the incident. Five copies of the Form were sent out: two to the Group HQ (one of which would then be sent to Command HQ), one to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and two to the Air Ministry in London. (Source: AMO A.1348/43)

At the Air Ministry, the copies were sent to the Directorate of Accident Prevention (abbreviated to DPA). The Forms were passed to PA2. PA2(a) would assess the accident and decide on further action; PA2(b) dealt with Courts of Inquiry; and PA2(C) compiled and kept the Form 1180s, and then liaised with the various other DPA departments which used the cards to issue warnings, develop preventative measures and co-ordinate with industry on the various issues arising.

Unfortunately I am not aware of any existing guidance for the filling out of these forms, the notches on the side are to a large extent self explanatory although without guide notes some of the meaning has been lost, across the top of the first card is the quarter of the year in which the accident happened, then the unit such Operational Training Unit or Advanced Flying Unit, the aircraft type by number code, command as in Fighter or Bomber etc. As I understand it the relevant sector was clipped on each 1180 and when filed this enabled brass rods to be inserted into the draw and to select cards displaying similar characteristics such as fatal accidents involving two engine aircraft at OTUs."

The Accident Report Card is the first official document that we viewed when we started our research, it inspired us to look further into the circumstances behind the loss of AW288. The document seems only to state that the aircraft crashed but offers no real reason or cause. The first Inspecting Officer has only reported the location of the accident:

"a/c crashed into a building 3 1/2 miles S.S.W. Of aerodrome."

The second Inspecting Officer has amended the document in several areas, and then given two scenarios which read as follows;

"A - The pilot broke cloud too quickly and did not see ground in time.

B - As he broke cloud the pilot reached forward to open jettison cocks. Result, aircraft dived in Angle of elevation. The pilot reduced speed, was too low in breaking cloud and stalled with insufficient height to recover. Concurs with Angle of elevation."

The clipped sections around the edge show amendments to the initial interpretation of the accident.The LOST CONTROL section has been altered from definite to possible, and the STAGE section has been changed from final descent to flight.

Both the scenarios suggested by the Inspecting Officer are feasible but incomplete.

There would have been no need for the pilot to drop below the cloud base at this stage of the flight unless there was an urgent reason to return to base. Indeed, for a long distance flight the pilot would normally climb to an economical cruising altitude to maximise the range of the aircraft and German fighters such as the Fw 190 weren't exactly unknown at low altitude near and over the Cornish coast. This scenario only makes sense if the crew were returning to base because the radio was faulty, which would also explain the lack of radio communication. However, it would have made more sense to circle to starboard and return over the coast.

Similarly, the pilot wouldn't be jettisoning fuel unless the plane was unable to maintain its height. In any instance it was impossible to jettison fuel from the auxiliary tank that filled the bomb bay or jettison that tank as bombs could have been. This scenario only makes sense if one of the engines had failed, which would also explain the lack of radio communication if it was the engine that powered the generator. Both explanations blame pilot error without pointing out that his actions could only have been prompted by an issue serious enough to require him to abort the flight.

Wanting to know more about the circumstances, and if any other documents relating to the aircraft existed, we contacted the RAF's Air Historical Branch; Flt/Lt Hudson kindly replied to our enquires.

"I have received your latest e-mail concerning Beaufort AW288 in which you have;

a. Asked where the information about eyewitnesses statements came from.

b. Requested copies of the statements.

c. Requested the Air Historical Branch to confirm whether or not it was standard practice to remove engines from crash sites.

d. Whether the engines of Beaufort AW288 were removed from the crash site.

My responses are set out below. A mention of eyewitnesses is made in the casualty records. A technical officer reported.

a. Eyewitnesses, who were unfortunately limited to local people without knowledge of aircraft, gave various statements. Some asserted that smoke was seen coming from the engines and some say not. The aircraft was seen by one witness flying normally halfway between the aerodrome and the scene of the crash. At this time it was at the cloud base which it occasionally entered.

b. There are no eyewitness statements amongst our records.

c. The RAF conducted investigations into aircraft accidents the main purpose being to establish the facts concerning an accident or incident as quickly as possible and to make recommendations aimed at preventing a recurrence. Any wreckage which could assist the investigation was inspected. This process would involve removal from the site when appropriate. Further, all metal etc was a valuable commodity during the War and Maintenance Units routinely salvage material from crash sites.

d. The technical officer who visited the crash site stated that the aircraft broke up in the crash and burnt. He said that due to the fire no technical evidence was available so that it was not possible to say whether a technical fault had occurred either in the airframe or engines. There is no further information and I am unable to say whether or not the engines were removed from the crash site... ...A Court of Inquiry was held into the loss of Beaufort AW288 but this has not survived.

The information I have provided is in our casualty records which are personnel records and are not in the public domain. It is not our policy to provide copies of documents taken from them. In addition to the fact sensitive/personal information is contained on casualty files, the documents held on the casualty records themselves are old, very fragile and generally in a very poor state, having been produced on wartime paper and much handled in the succeeding years. They would be further damaged by modern reproduction processes such as photocopying. Instead, we extract information from them to release in response to enquiries as I have done in answering your enquiries.

The information I have provided to you is in the Form 765c which is a brief report on Flying Accident or Forced Landing not Attributable to Enemy Action made before the Courts of Inquiry made their Findings. The F765c relating to this accident is contained in the casualty file. The Technical/Specialist officer was an engineering officer and wrote;

The aircraft took off from Portreath at 8.50 hours on 24.7.42. It took off from a runway in a S.W. direction from a course slightly West of that line with instructions to set course without circling. The cloud base was low at the time.

At 0855 hours it crashed into a chapel at Roscroggan 3 1/2 miles S.S.W of the aerodrome and was apparently flying in a direction which indicated that he was circling or returning.

Eyewitnesses, who were unfortunately limited to local people without knowledge of aircraft, gave various statements. Some asserted that smoke was coming from the engines and some say not. The aircraft was seen by one witness flying normally halfway between the aerodrome and the scene of the crash. At this time it was at the cloud base which it occasionally entered.

Accounts seem to agree that the aircraft circled and that the engine note increased immediately before the crash.

The aircraft broke up in the crash and burnt. No technical evidence was obtainable.

Unfortunately no radio communications were received from the aircraft.

The aircraft had arrived at Portreath on 17 July 1942 and no defects were reported on arrival. No engineering maintenance other than routine daily maintenance was carried out at Portreath and an air test had been done on 23 July 1942 with no problems reported.

I hope this clarifies matters for you.

Yours sincerely,

M Hudson"